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Abstract
The law and economics movement is the principal interdisciplinary ﬁ eld of legal studies. 
This paper traces the history of the movement and explains its basic principles, contrasts 
the version of the movement that predominates in the United States with the version 
that prevails in Europe. It is observed the greater emphasis of the former on substantive 
doctrine and of the latter is focused on rule of law considerations, and emphasizes the 
importance of the movement for legal and economic reform in developing nations. 
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Resumo
O movimento do direito e economia é o principal campo interdisciplinar dos estudos 
jurídicos. Este artigo faz um levantamento histórico do movimento e explica seus 
princípios básicos, contrastando a versão do movimento que predomina nos Estados 
Unidos com a versão que prevalece na Europa. Observa-se, assim, maior ênfase da 
primeira na doutrina substantiva, e a segunda foca os aspectos de estado de direito, 
enfatizando a importância do movimento para reformas jurídicas e econômicas nas 
nações em desenvolvimento.
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1 This is the revised draft of a plenary lecture given at the XXI World Congress of the Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) in Lund, Sweden, 
on August 14, 2003. I thank the participants in the Congress for comments that have helped me in revising my lecture for publication.  
2 Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School LBQ 611, 1111 E. 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637, U.S.A.
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Rapid increases in recent decades in the scope
and rigor of microeconomics have fostered the 
emergence and stimulated the continuing growth of a 
distinct and important subﬁ eld of legal theory economic 
analysis of law, or as it is more commonly (if somewhat 
misleadingly) called, “law and economics”. Each of the 
leading U.S. law schools has one or more PhD economists 
on its faculty, and, in addition, professors in the regular 
law courses will often include the economic perspective 
in their course. Nine journals (eight American, one 
European) specialize in the economic analysis of law3. 
There are several textbooks, a large monographic 
literature, two multivolume encyclopedias (both edited 
by Europeans), and professional associations in the 
United States, Europe, Latin America, Australia, and 
Canada. Several federal appellate judges in the United 
States, including one of the Supreme Court Justices, are 
former law and economics scholars (Stephen Breyer 
is the Justice, and among the federal court of appeals 
judges are Guido Calabresi, Frank Easterbrook, Douglas 
Ginsburg, Stephen Williams, Ralph Winter, and myself); 
and most federal, and many state, judges have attended 
continuing education programs in economic analysis of 
law. 
Anthony Kronman, the dean of the Yale Law 
School, a critic of the law and economics movement, 
nevertheless calls it “an enormous enlivening force in 
American legal thought”, and says that it “continues 
and remains the single most inﬂ uential jurisprudential 
school in this country”4. 
Despite Professor Kronman’s reference to 
“American thought” and “this country” (i.e., the United 
States), the law and economics movement is genuinely 
international, and has as much relevance to civil law and 
developing countries as it does to the Anglo-American 
common law countries. Indeed, there is a distinctive 
“civilian” law and economics movement that focuses on 
rule of law issues that are of particular importance to 
developing countries. 
Economic analysis of law has heuristic, descriptive, 
and normative aspects (for a fuller discussion, see 
Posner, 2003a). As a heuristic, it seeks to display 
underlying unities in legal doctrines and institutions; in 
its descriptive mode, it seeks to identify the economic 
logic and effects of doctrines and institutions and the 
economic causes of legal change; and in its normative 
aspect it advises judges and other policymakers on the 
most efﬁ cient methods of regulating conduct through 
law. The range of its subject matter has become wide, 
indeed all-encompassing. Exploiting advances in the 
economics of nonmarket behavior, economic analysis 
of law has expanded far beyond its original focus on 
antitrust, taxation, public utility regulation, corporate 
ﬁ nance, and other areas of explicitly economic 
regulation; while, within that domain, it has expanded 
to include such ﬁ elds as property and contract law, 
pension law, secured transactions and bankruptcy 
law, and, notably, intellectual property law, a ﬁ eld of 
especially rapid growth and economic signiﬁ cance. 
The “new” economic analysis of law embraces such 
nonmarket, or quasi-nonmarket, ﬁ elds of law as tort 
law, family law, criminal law, free speech, procedure and 
evidence, legislation, public international law, the law 
of privacy, the rules governing the trial and appellate 
process, environmental law, the administrative process, 
the regulation of health and safety, the laws forbidding 
discrimination in employment, and social norms viewed 
as a source of, an obstacle to, and a substitute for 
formal law. It also includes the study of the principal 
legal institutions, including judge and jury, regulatory 
agencies, and legislatures. Economists are extensively 
employed as expert witnesses in such ﬁ elds as antitrust 
and securities regulation, as well as in every type of case 
- personal-injury cases as well as commercial cases - in 
which damages have to be calculated or other forms of 
legal remedy applied. 
Although economic analysis of law has had its 
biggest practical impact in ﬁ elds of explicitly economic 
regulation, such as antitrust and public utility regulation, 
where economic analysts have played a signiﬁ cant role 
in orienting American law in a free-market direction, 
increasingly its mark is felt in other areas of law as well, 
such as environmental law, where tradable emissions 
rights are a hallmark of the economic approach to the 
environment, the law of eminent domain, where the 
increasing judicial concern with “regulatory” takings 
bears the stamp of the economic analysts of law, and 
divorce law, where feminist and economic insights 
have joined to emphasize the economic dimension 
of household production, resulting in the adoption 
3 Journal of Legal Studies, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, American Law and Economics Review, International Review of Law and 
Economics, Supreme Court Economic Review, Research in Law and Economics, Commentaries on Law and Economics, and European Journal of Law and Economics; and next year 
the European Association for Law and Economics plans to launch its own journal. In addition, many articles applying economic analysis of law appear in the standard law 
reviews and economics journals.
4 Remarks of Kronman (1995) at the Second Driker Forum for Excellence in the Law. 
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by courts of new methods for dividing property and 
calculating alimony in divorce cases. The recent ﬁ nancial 
scandals in the United States, however, are bound to 
refocus economic analysis of law on one of its core 
concerns, the problem of “agency costs” in the corpo-
rate domain, that is, the problem of aligning the incentives 
of corporate managers with those of the corporation’s 
diffuse owners, the shareholders, who may have little 
incentive or information for monitoring the behavior of 
their (nominal) agents, the managers. 
The most ambitious theoretical aspect of the 
economic approach to law has been the proposal 
of a uniﬁ ed economic theory of law. In that theory 
(comprehensively expounded in Posner, 2003a), law’s 
function is understood to be to facilitate the operation 
of free markets and, in areas where the costs of market 
transactions are prohibitive, to “mimic the market” 
by decreeing the outcome that the market could be 
expected to produce if market transactions were 
feasible. A corollary of this proposition is the positive 
economic theory of the common law, the theory that 
the Anglo-American common Law (that is, judge-made 
as distinct from legislated law, encompassing such 
important ﬁ elds as property, contract, trust, and tort 
law, as well as basic criminal, procedural, and remedial 
law) is best understood as if the judges in fashioning that 
law had been consciously trying (which they were not) 
to bring about an efﬁ cient allocation of resources.
The positive theory builds on Ronald Coase’s 
famous article, from the early 1960s, on social cost 
(Coase, 1960). The “Coase Theorem” holds that where 
market transaction costs are zero, the law’s initial 
assignment of rights is irrelevant to efﬁ ciency, since if 
the assignment is inefﬁ cient the parties will rectify it 
by a corrective transaction. There are two important 
corollaries. The ﬁ rst is that the law, to the extent 
concerned with promoting economic efﬁ ciency, should 
strive to minimize transaction costs, for example by 
clearly deﬁ ning property rights, by making them readily 
transferable, and by creating cheap and effective remedies 
for breach of contract. Economic analysts of law have 
identiﬁ ed a number of doctrines, procedures, and 
institutions for achieving the aim of minimizing market 
transaction costs. Immediately, however, a question 
arises concerning comparative law and economics. When 
doctrines are found to differ across countries, should the 
difference be ascribed to relevant economic differences 
or to the fact that some countries do not have efﬁ cient 
legal doctrines? Consider for example the fact that the 
standard remedy for breaching of contract in Anglo-
American law is damaged, with speciﬁ c performance 
(i.e., an order, injunctive in nature, commanding the 
contract breaker to perform his obligations under the 
contract) available only when damages are inadequate, 
and Continental law, where speciﬁ c performance is a 
routine rather than exceptional remedy for breaching 
of contract5. Are the Anglo-American rule efﬁ cient 
and the Continental inefﬁ cient, or vice versa? Perhaps 
both are efﬁ cient, given different economic conditions. 
To the extent that – for reasons that may be unrelated 
to differences in legal institutions – the United States 
has a more dynamic economy than that of Continental 
Europe, in the sense of more rapidly adaptive to changed 
conditions and new opportunities, there is greater 
need to allow adjustment of contractual relations 
when conditions change from what they were when a 
contract was made. A remedial system that emphasizes 
damages makes it easier for either party to “walk away” 
from the contract, because he cannot be forced by a 
court to perform his contractual duties, though he must 
compensate the other party for the consequences of 
the breach. In contrast, when speciﬁ c performance is 
a standard remedy for breaching of contract, a party 
cannot walk away from the contract without ﬁ rst 
negotiating a settlement with the other party that 
will induce the latter to forget his remedy of speciﬁ c 
performance, and the need for such a negotiation will 
make it harder to abandon the contract, and, at the least, 
introduce delay. 
The second corollary of the economic approach 
to law that I am expounding is that where, despite the 
law’s best efforts, market transaction costs remain 
high, the law should simulate the market’s allocation of 
resources by assigning property rights to the highest-
valued users. An example is the fair-use doctrine of U.S. 
copyright law, which among other things allows writers 
to publish short quotations from a copyrighted work 
without negotiating with the copyright holder (17 U.S.C. 
sec. 107; Landes and Posner, 2003, chap. 4). The costs 
of such negotiations would usually be prohibitive; and 
when they were not prohibitive the usual result of 
the negotiation thus enabled would be to permit the 
quotation at a price very close to zero, and so the 
doctrine of fair use brings about the result that the 
market would bring about if market transactions were 
feasible. 
5 This actually exaggerates the difference in practice between the two regimes of contract remedy; but there is some difference.
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Coase’s (1960) article, important as it is, was 
not the beginning of economic analysis of law. That 
economics has a relation to law had been known at 
least since Hobbes’s discussion of property in the 
seventeenth century. Both David Hume and Adam Smith 
discussed the economic functions of law.
Jeremy Bentham’s contribution was fundamental, 
both in extending economic thinking to nonmarket 
behavior and in applying the extension to the criminal 
law. On the European Continent, Max Weber made 
important contributions to understanding law’s 
economic role. By the 1930s a handful of legal ﬁ elds, 
mainly antitrust and public utility regulation, that dealt 
explicitly with competition and monopoly were receiving 
the sustained attention of leading English and American 
economists. And by 1968, when Gary Becker published 
an article on the economics of crime and punishment 
(Becker, 1968), reviving and reﬁ ning Bentham, it began to 
seem that, perhaps, no ﬁ eld of law could not be placed 
under the lens of economics with illuminating results. 
The decades since have vindicated that expectation. 
Lately the range and depth of the economic approach 
to law have been enlarged by developments in game 
theory, signaling theory, and the economics of non-
rational behavior (“behavioral economics”). As I have
emphasized, it is not merely an ivory-towered 
enterprise. In the United States it has inﬂ uenced, in 
addition to the examples I gave earlier, the calculation 
of damages in personal injury suits, the regulation of the 
securities markets, the content of federal sentencing 
guidelines, and the law governing investment by pension 
funds and other trustees. The deregulation movement 
and the increased respectability of free-market ideology 
generally, owe something, and perhaps a great deal, to 
the law and economics movement. 
Non-economists tend to associate economics 
with money, capitalism, selﬁ shness, a reductive, unrealistic 
conception of human motivation and behavior, a 
formidable mathematical apparatus, and a penchant 
for cynical, pessimistic, and conservative conclusions. It 
earned the sobriquet of “the dismal science” because 
of Thomas Malthus’s thesis that famine, war, and sexual 
abstinence were the only ways in which population 
and food supply could be equilibrated. The essence of 
economics is none of these things, however. The essence 
is extremely simple, although the simplicity is deceptive. 
The simple can be subtle, can be counterintuitive; 
its antithesis is “complicated,” not “difﬁ cult”. Most 
economic analysis consists of tracing out the conse-
quences of assuming that people are more or less ration-
al in their social interactions, which means little more 
than that people prefer more to less, in other words 
picking efﬁ cient means to their ends (instrumental 
rationality), whatever those may be. In the case of the 
activities that interest the law, these people may be 
criminals or prosecutors or parties to accidents or 
taxpayers or tax collectors or striking workers – or 
even law students. Students treat grades as prices, so 
that unless the university administration intervenes, 
unpopular professors, in order to keep up their 
enrollments, will sometimes compensate students for the 
low perceived value of the course by giving them higher 
grades, that is, by raising the price that the professor 
pays for the student (or, equivalently and perhaps more 
intuitively, reducing the cost to the student of enrolling 
in the professor’s course). This very simple analysis 
of incentives is helpful in explaining the well-known 
phenomenon of “grade inﬂ ation”, the tendency of 
average grades to drift upward – even though students 
are not becoming smarter or working harder. Grade 
inﬂ ation has coincided in the United States with the 
decline in the proportion of required courses. The more 
courses are elective rather than required, the greater 
is the competition among professors for students, and 
so the more frequent is the awarding of high grades as 
a way of attracting or retaining students, imparting an 
upward thrust to grade-point averages. 
I said that the economist’s tracing out of the 
consequences of a practice or policy is subtle as well 
as simple, and here is an example. The “spendthrift 
trust”, a very common form of trust in the United 
States, withholds from the trustee authority to pay 
out any of the money or other property in the trust 
to the creditors of the trust’s beneﬁ ciaries. The law will 
enforce such a restriction, yet it has seemed to many 
students of the law a fraud on creditors for the trust 
beneﬁ ciary, assuming that his whole wealth is in the 
spendthrift trust, can borrow all he wants, spend what 
he borrows, and not be coercible by law to repay the 
lenders. But economics suggests the opposite conclusion 
– that, provided the provision preventing creditors from 
reaching into the trust is not concealed, a spendthrift 
trust limits borrowing by the trust beneﬁ ciary, because 
he can’t offer security to the lender; he, thus can’t make 
a credible commitment to repay. From here it is but 
a step to see how increasing the rights of debtors in 
bankruptcy, far from causing an avalanche of reckless 
borrowing, could reduce the amount of borrowing, and 
so the incidence of bankruptcy, by causing lenders to 
make smaller loans to risky borrowers. So lenders may 
oppose easy bankruptcy not because they fear that there 
will be more defaults, but because they fear a reduction in 
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the volume of loans. Imagine how few loans there would 
be if borrowers had no obligation to repay. Notice also 
how creditors are as badly hurt by excessively stringent 
as by excessively lenient bankruptcy rules. If creditors 
had the legal right, as under ancient Roman law, to carve 
up a defaulting borrower into as many pieces as there 
were creditors, the default rate on loans would be very 
low but most people would be afraid to borrow it. 
Rationality implies decision-making, and people 
often have to make decisions under conditions of 
profound uncertainty. Consider the question how much 
care a rational person should take to avoid an accident. 
The accident will occur with probability P and impose a 
cost (call it “L,” for loss), while eliminating the possibility 
of such an accident would impose a cost on the potential 
injurer, a cost that I shall call B (for burden). The cost 
of avoiding the accident will be less than the expected 
accident cost (or beneﬁ t of avoiding the accident) if B 
is smaller than L discounted (multiplied) by P; that is, 
Law and Economics 71. B < PL. In that event, should the 
potential injurer fail to take the precaution (perhaps 
because he does not reckon the cost to the accident 
victim a cost to him) and should the accident occur as 
a result of that failure, he is properly regarded as being 
at fault and is made to pay the victim’s damages so that 
other potential injurers in his position will be given an 
incentive to take cost-justiﬁ ed precautions. B < PL is 
the negligence formula announced by the noted federal 
appellate judge Learned Hand in a judicial opinion 
in 1947 but not recognized as an economic formula 
for negligence until many years later. The formula is 
simple, but its elaboration and its application to speciﬁ c 
doctrines in the law of torts have generated an immense 
and illuminating literature. Hand was not an economist, 
and he proposed the formula to decide a legal case. This 
is an example of the isomorphism of legal doctrines and 
economic principles; the latter can often be used to 
illuminate and reﬁ ne the former. That isomorphism is a 
key to the fruitfulness of positive economics of law, that 
is, to understanding the law as a system for economic 
optimization. 
I have been discussing accidental injuries, but 
the Hand formula can accommodate deliberate ones as 
well, simply by putting a minus sign in front of B. That 
models the case in which, rather than having to expend 
resources in order to avoid an injury (positive B), the 
injurer expends resources on inﬂ icting the injury, so that 
he would actually save resources by not injuring (negative 
B). Since PL, being a positive number, must always be 
greater than a negative B, it is apparent that deliberate as 
distinct from accidental injuries should be presumptively 
unlawful. It is a mite less obvious that deliberate injuries 
cannot be left entirely to the tort system to deter. The 
person who expends resources in order to inﬂ ict an 
injury is likely to anticipate a substantial gain, whether 
pecuniary or nonpecuniary, from succeeding; he is also 
likely to take measures to avoid detection. On both 
counts, the optimal sanction for a deliberate injury is 
likely to be higher than that for an accidental injury. For 
example, if the prospective injurer anticipates a net gain 
of G, and a probability of being punished of P < 1, the 
sanction must be ﬁ xed at S = G/P to equal his expected 
beneﬁ t of injuring and, thus, make inﬂ icting the injury 
worthless to him. Many deliberate injurers cannot pay 
the optimal sanction, and so society has to resort to 
nonpecuniary sanctions in an effort to impose on the 
injurer a disutility equal to or greater than the expected 
utility to him of the injury. Moreover, many deliberate 
injurers have no assets – this may be why they turned 
to crime to support themselves – and so the victims of 
deliberate injuries will often lack an incentive to bring 
a tort suit. On both counts, then, society needs to have 
criminal law to back up tort law. This analysis helps to 
explain the extraordinary severity of penalties for illegal 
trafﬁ cking in drugs, a crime the social costs of which 
probably are low. That is immaterial, once a decision is 
made to criminalize and thus try to deter the conduct. 
Because the sale of drugs is a potentially lucrative 
business (high G), and, more important, because as a 
“victimless” crime the difﬁ culty of apprehension is acute 
(low P), the optimal sanction is high. 
Let me turn to a less familiar use of economic 
analysis than explaining the economic rationality of 
rules and practices: simplifying legal analysis by breaking 
down doctrinal boundaries. We already glimpsed this 
in relating criminal to tort law, assigning the former a 
supplementing role. And notice how decision under 
uncertainty played a decisive role in both analyses. 
The uncertainty of the criminal’s being caught, like the 
uncertainty of a careless act’s leading to injury, is a 
critical determinant of the optimal sanction. 
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 
involved the legality under antitrust law of a contract 
by which a supplier of patent medicines forbade his 
dealers to charge a price for his medicines lower than 
his suggested retail price; this is the practice known as 
resale price maintenance. The Supreme Court held the 
practice illegal, pointing out that it had the same effect as 
would an agreement among the dealers to ﬁ x the price 
at which they would sell Dr. Miles’s medicines – that is, 
the same effect as a dealers’ cartel, which would be a 
per se violation of antitrust law. But there was another 
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effect, which the Court overlooked. Dealers who are 
unable to compete in price yet would make money if they 
could sell more will compete in non-price dimensions of 
competition instead, such as stocking more inventory 
or having better-informed salespeople, in order to 
attract more customers, since every additional sale will 
generate a proﬁ t equal to the difference between the 
resale price ﬁ xed by the supplier and the cost to the 
dealer of the additional sale. If dealer-provided services 
are important to the manufacturer’s marketing strategy, 
he can use resale price maintenance to evoke them. For 
by setting the minimum resale price above the dealer’s 
barebones cost of sale, the manufacturer will be giving 
dealers an incentive to compete with one another for 
additional sales by offering customers more service. 
This competition will transform the proﬁ t built into 
the minimum resale price into enhanced point-of-sale 
services – which is what the manufacturer wants. 
A dealers’ cartel would have this effect too; 
members of the cartel, each of whom would like to 
increase his sales at the cartel price because that price 
is by deﬁ nition above cost, would try to lure customers 
from other dealers by offering better service. The 
difference is that in the cartel case the dealer may be 
providing more service than the customer wants; the 
customer might prefer a lower price with less service. 
If that is indeed what the customer prefers, the supplier 
will not engage in resale price maintenance, for if he did 
he would lose business and proﬁ ts to a competitor who 
did not engage in the practice. My next example may 
seem unrelated. Critics of the deregulation of the airline 
industry have pointed out that airline service is in some 
respects inferior to what it was in the days when it was a 
regulated industry. Planes are more crowded, there is less 
legroom, the food is poorer6. Gone, for example, are the 
piano bars from American Airlines’ Boeing 747s. This is 
what economics predicted. The regulated airline industry 
was a government enforced cartel. Prices were kept high 
and as a result competition was deﬂ ected into non-price 
competition. When the airlines had ﬁ nally competed away 
all their cartel proﬁ ts in the form of service competition, 
the industry was ripe for deregulation. And when it was 
ﬁ nally deregulated, price fell and with it the level of service, 
because this combination was what the consuming public 
wanted, as we can infer from the enormous growth in air 
travel since deregulation. 
So we see – and this is the point of the discussion 
– that resale price maintenance of patent medicines 
and the deregulation of airline transportation raise the 
same economic issue, that of the relation between price 
and non-price competition, even though one involves 
goods and the other services, one is old and the other 
is recent, and one involves the judicial interpretation 
of the antitrust laws while the other legislative reform 
of common carrier regulation. This is a recurrent 
experience in the economic analysis of law. Practices, 
institutions, bodies of law that are wholly unrelated 
when viewed through the lens of orthodox legal analysis 
are seen to involve the identical economic issue. Whole 
ﬁ elds of law are interchangeable when viewed through 
the lens of economics. When I was a law student, the 
law seemed a collection of completely unrelated rules, 
procedures, and institutions. Economics reveals a deep 
structure of law that has considerable coherence. This 
is extremely important both to law teaching and, as 
in my example of the differences in Anglo-American 
and Continental contract remedies, to the study of 
comparative law. 
I have been discussing American law and the 
American law and economics movement, though 
much of what I have said is equally applicable to 
civil law systems. Though I mentioned a doctrinal 
difference, the number and size of those differences, 
among nations at comparable levels of economic and 
political development, are, I believe, generally modest. 
The institutional differences, however, are profound, 
having mainly to do with the different structures of 
the judicial career in Anglo-American (especially U.S.) 
versus Continental, and most other, legal systems. I will 
come back to that point; but ﬁ rst I want to explain what 
I said at the outset was the distinctively civilian “take” 
on law and economics. It begins with Aristotle, who in 
the Nicomachean Ethics set forth a theory of law that 
he called “corrective justice”. The essential point that 
Aristotle made is that if someone through wrongful 
behavior (the wrongdoer) disturbs the preexisting 
balance between himself and another person to the 
injury of the latter (the victim), some form of redress 
must be provided that will, to the feasible extent, 
restore that preexisting balance – that will correct, in 
other words, the departure from equilibrium that was 
brought about by the wrongful act.
Aristotle derived from his theory of corrective 
justice a corollary of critical importance to the evolution 
of legal theory. The corollary is that corrective justice 
abstracts from the personal qualities, the merit or 
6 These developments were well advanced before the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, resulted in increased costs of and reduced demand 
for airline service, spurring further cuts in quality.
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desert, of the wrongdoer and his victim. The victim may 
be a bad man and the wrongdoer a good one, having 
in mind the character and entire course of a person’s 
career, the summation of all his good and bad deeds, 
and not just the particular episode that resulted in the 
injury to the victim. Nevertheless, the victim is entitled 
to redress. The reason this is a corollary of corrective 
justice rather than a separate principle of justice is 
that corrective justice seeks to redress a preexisting 
equilibrium rather than to change it. The court doesn’t 
use the occasion to enrich or impoverish wrongdoer 
or victim on the basis of a judgment about their merits 
or deserts apart from the circumstances of the injury 
itself, for that would be not to restore the parties to the 
preexisting equilibrium but to create a new equilibrium. 
This process of correction remains a cornerstone 
of law in all civilized societies. The reason is practical 
(Aristotle was a practical thinker). If obtaining redress 
for injuries depended on a person’s reputation, people 
would invest inordinate resources in becoming well liked, 
well regarded. To the extent such investments took the 
form of doing genuinely good things, they would enhance 
social welfare. But often it would be much easier to 
obtain a good reputation by cultivating the friendship of 
the powerful, allying with the powerful through marriage, 
avoiding unpopular stands, and other methods unrelated, 
indeed detrimental, to the good of society. Furthermore, 
even when a person obtained a good reputation by good 
means, once he had that reputation and could use it to 
inﬂ ict wrongful injuries with impunity on persons who 
did not have a good reputation, incentives to wrongful 
behavior would be created. The friendless would be an 
outlaw class on whom any of the “good” could prey 
with impunity. Energies would be deﬂ ected from socially 
constructive activities into rent seeking and clientelism. 
The state would be weakened. 
So we want law to be “impersonal” in rather a 
literal sense. We want the judges to abstract from the 
personal characteristics of the parties to the litigation 
before them and treat them as representatives of 
classes of activity, such as drivers and pedestrians. 
This aspiration for legal justice received canonical 
expression (in the civilian tradition) in Max Weber’s 
concept of formal rationality. Law engaged Weber’s 
interest as both an illustration of and as a causal 
agent in the process of modernization (more broadly, 
of social evolution), a process that is at the heart of 
Weberian sociology. Modernization is for Weber the 
process by which instrumental rationality, implemented 
through such institutions and practices as bureaucracy, 
professionalism, and specialization, comes to supplant 
older methods of social ordering. The older methods 
include family and clan ties, magic, charisma, intimidation, 
and other means of social control in which non-
rational associations and inﬂ uences predominate. Law, 
in Weber’s analysis, participates in this modernizing 
process by shucking off its supernatural, charismatic, 
and discretionary elements and becoming increasingly 
cut-and-dried, rational, and bureaucratic – increasingly a 
system in which disinterested civil servants, constituting 
a professionalized judiciary, resolve disputes by applying 
clearly stated rules designed to promote rational 
economic planning by private and public actors to facts 
that these civil servants also ascertain rationally. The 
rules do not prescribe any private actions – do not tell 
people what contracts to make, what risks to take, what 
callings to follow. Instead they create the framework 
within which people can go about their business – 
acquiring and exploiting property, making contracts, 
investing and lending, engaging in risky activities, and so 
forth, conﬁ dent that known, clear, substantively neutral 
rules provide the exclusive statement of their public 
rights and duties. To the extent that the legal system 
conforms to these criteria, it attains formal rationality – 
the optimal environment for capitalism.
Judges are not to be the cheerleaders for 
capitalism, however. They are to enforce the abstract 
norms of the law without regard to the consequences 
for the persons and activities encountered in the cases 
that they are called upon to decide. This neutrality, 
neutrality not only as to personal worth as in Aristotle’s 
concept of corrective justice, but as to ideology as well, 
is important not only for enhancing the predictability 
of law – and it is predictability, above all, that Weber 
thought capitalists require of the legal framework – 
but also for reassuring the potentially restive classes in 
society that the law is not infected by class bias. 
The legal system that Weber had in mind as 
exemplary for modernization was the civil-law system 
found in Germany and other Continental nations. Yet the 
earliest capitalist superpower, namely Great Britain, and 
the most advanced capitalist power of his day as of ours, 
namely the United States, were common law rather than 
code countries. The embarrassment that the common 
law poses for Weber’s thesis is only slight, however. The 
Continental judiciary is (and was in Weber’s time as well) 
more creative and less rule-bound, less “bureaucratic,” 
than Weber believed, while the common law has always 
been more predictable than outsiders realize; and so in 
short the common law and civilian legal traditions are 
convergent. What capitalism essentially requires of law 
is the protection of property rights, and enforcement 
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of freedom of contract, by reasonably disinterested 
judges, rather than the maximum clarity and coherence 
attainable by legal rules. 
The content of legal rules is as important as their 
form, moreover, and the common law rules fashioned 
by English and American judges may have contained 
precepts more supportive of economic efﬁ ciency than 
the counterpart rules in civilian countries. The reason 
may be that English and American judges are generally 
appointed from the practice of law and are, thus, more 
worldly than their counterparts in the career judiciaries 
of the civilian legal systems. 
Friedrich Hayek carried Weber’s emphasis on 
formal rationality to the point of denying that judges 
should utilize economics in their decisions (Posner, 
2003b, chap. 7). Hayek argued for this position in part 
because of his great respect for custom (“spontaneous 
order,” in his lexicon), which he thought would provide 
more efﬁ cient rules than anything a public ofﬁ cial, 
including a judge, could devise, but partly also because 
of a Weberian distrust of judicial discretion. For reasons 
that I cannot go into here but have discussed at length 
elsewhere (see Posner, 2003b, chap. 7), Hayek goes too 
far in promoting custom as a source of law, neglecting 
the fact that inefﬁ cient customs are inevitable given 
the process by which customs are formed and the 
difﬁ culty (because of the decentralized character of 
custom formation) of changing them to keep abreast 
of social and economic change, a problem that is more 
acute the more dynamic the society. And hence Hayek’s 
prescription is especially inapt for the United States.
The emphasis that what I am calling the civilian 
law and economics movement places on broad rule-
of-law values rather than on detailed doctrines and 
procedures of the sort I discussed earlier in this paper 
has particular relevance for developing countries; a brief 
ampliﬁ cation of this point will bring the paper to a close. 
When law is weak, the enforcement of property 
and contract rights frequently depends on the threat and 
sometimes the actuality of violence, on family alliances 
that may be dysfunctional in the conditions of a modern 
economy, and on cumbersome methods of self-protection. 
These substitutes also create a bias against new ﬁ rms, which 
do not have a reputation that they can use to persuade 
potential contracting partners of their reliability, and a 
bias in favor of simple, simultaneous exchanges over more 
complex transactions, since the more nearly simultaneous 
the performance of the parties to a contract is, the less 
need there is for a legal remedy against nonperformance. 
A poor country may not be able to afford a 
good legal system, but without a good legal system 
it may never become rich enough to afford such a 
system. It can be argued, therefore, that since it is much 
more costly and time-consuming to create efﬁ cient 
legal institutions than to enact efﬁ cient rules for the 
existing inefﬁ cient institutions to administer, the focus 
of reform should be on the latter (see Hay et al., 1996). 
The creation and dissemination of a rule involve small 
ﬁ xed costs and (like other information goods) negligible 
marginal costs, while legal institutions require heavy 
inputs of high-priced, educated labor. This implies that 
the rules-ﬁ rst strategy is better the more populous a 
country is, because the cost of creating a rule is invariant 
to the number of people the rule will apply to, though 
this advice must be tempered by recognition that the 
more populous a country, the more heterogeneous it is 
likely to be, which may require a corresponding variety 
of rules. However this may be, China, the world’s most 
populous country, has followed the rules-ﬁ rst strategy, 
introducing modern, commercially oriented rules of law 
at the same time that it liberalized the economy. 
The relative simplicity of rules as compared to 
standards has two consequences for the kind of weak 
judiciary common in a developing country. Applying rules 
places fewer demands on the time and the competence 
of the judges and is, therefore, both cheaper and more 
likely to be accurate. Rules also facilitate the monitoring 
of judges, and so reduce the likelihood of bribery and 
the inﬂ uence of politics in the judicial process. The less 
discretion a judge has in making decisions, the easier 
it will be for observers to determine whether he has 
decided a case contrary to law or is systematically 
favoring one class or group of litigants over another. 
This is of course the sort of consideration that greatly 
inﬂ uenced Weber and Hayek.
Other economic measures for reducing judicial 
corruption and incompetence include:
(i) Backloading judicial compensation by creating 
generous pension rights that are forfeited if the judge is 
removed from ofﬁ ce for incompetence or venality. Even 
if the likelihood that his misbehavior will be detected is 
slight, if the cost to him if it is detected is very great, he 
may be deterred because the expected cost (the cost if 
he is detected multiplied by the probability of detection) 
may be great (see Becker and Stigler, 1974). 
(ii) Having judges sit in panels rather than by 
themselves or having them sit with juries. In either case, 
both the transaction costs of bribery, and the likelihood 
that if he accepts bribes this will be discovered, will rise. 
(iii) Reducing penalties in order to reduce the 
gain from bribing judges and other ofﬁ cials not to impose 
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them. If the ﬁ ne for speeding were $1,000, the incentive 
of a police ofﬁ cer to demand and of the speeder to pay 
a bribe to avoid a ticket would be great.
(iv) Prioritizing. If the greatest danger to a 
developing nation’s prosperity is the threat that 
government will conﬁ scate people’s property, then it 
may make sense to establish a special court whose 
sole mission is to check the government (the French 
approach – the Conseil d’État is that court). The judges 
of this court will have to be competent, ethical, and 
well-paid, but since the court’s jurisdiction will be so 
circumscribed, the aggregate resources of both human 
and physical capital required to equip the court will 
be modest. And if the court is conﬁ ned to purely 
economic issues, the political authorities may be 
willing to tolerate its independence, especially if they 
understand how much such an institution can do for 
the nation’s prosperity. 
As the examples I have given throughout this 
paper illustrate, the basic job of the economist is to 
remind people, notably including lawyers and judges, 
of the consequences that non-economists tend to 
overlook, consequences that often though not always 
are adverse or at least costly, of actual or proposed 
policies and practices. This use of economics ought 
to be welcomed by lawyers who think it is important 
to discover what the actual consequences of legal 
doctrines and institutions are, even those doctrines and 
institutions that have achieved sacred-cow status within 
the legal profession, and by judges who must cope with 
a wide range of cases, not only commercial ones, that 
present economic issues. It ought to be welcomed 
by law professors as well who seek to advance the 
understanding of the legal system, to stimulate their 
students, and to create a theoretical framework for 
grasping the underlying unity, and social utility, of the law. 
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